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This article examines the use of the phrase ‘balancing the interests’ in political 
debate relating to copyright law.  I argue that this phrase no longer leads  to 
broad debate on the proper balance to be struck  between private, public and 
social  interests  in  copyright  law.   Rather,  today   the  phrase  has  come  to 
represent a type of police logic which reflects the private interests of copyright 
owners  and users  as  they  already exist.   Drawing  on the  work  of  Jacques 
Rancière  I  suggest  that  this  balance  of  private  interests  may be upset  by a 
strategy  of  ‘subjectivisation’  which  challenges  the  existing  distribution  of 
social bodies by making new subjects appear.  I conclude  that the recent cases 
of Telstra Corporation v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd2 and IceTV Pty  
Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd3 represent a surprising and effective use 
of this strategy by reintroducing the ‘artist’ and the ‘maker’ into copyright law 
in such a way as to upset and displace the prior claims of copyright owners and 
users. 
 ‘Balancing the interests’ has become a commonplace phrase in Australian political debate 
and in this article I consider its use in relation to copyright law reform and how it came to 
replace the more politically familiar  ‘compromise’.   I  argue that ‘balancing the interests’, 
unlike  compromise,  does  not  demand  a  sacrifice  by  the  people,  nor  promise  a  common 
historical end.  Rather, it provides a reflection of a ‘workable’ balance of private copyright 
interests which already exists. 
1 Associate Professor,  Faculty of Law, University of Technology, Sydney.
2 Telstra Corporation v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44.
3 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14; (2009) 254 ALR 386.
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I argue that in striking such a balance the legislature exercises neither the skills of the judge 
as represented by Lady Justicia, nor the wisdom of statesmanship as represented by King 
Solomon.  Rather, the legislature takes on the role of Circus Ringmaster who draws attention 
to and bathes in the reflected glory of a state of balance, a balancing act, which already exists. 
Drawing on the work of Jacques Rancière, I characterise this as a form of ‘police logic’ – that 
is,  a  totalising  discourse  which  legitimates  consent  by  excluding  from  consideration 
substantive issues of social meaning as well as those who do not count.4
I pose the question of what it might take to upset this balance of private copyright interests. I 
argue  that  political  consultation  and negotiation  may  be  ineffective  insofar  as  they  have 
become  just  another  technique  to  more  finely  calibrate  the  existing  balance.   Rancière 
suggests an alternative  strategy which he calls  ‘subjectivisation’,  that  is  a strategy which 
challenges the  existing distribution of social bodies (the balance) by making new subjects 
appear.5 I  argue  that  the  work  of  writers  such  as  Drahos,  Correa  and  Sell  might  be 
characterised as forms of subjectivisation but that, to the extent that their new subjects base 
their claims on a functional relationship with the copyright work, their attempts to disrupt the 
balance of private interests of copyright owners and users has been only partially successful. 
If subjectivisation is to successfully  disrupt this balance perhaps a new subject is needed 
whose prior legal claim displaces the merely functional claims of the copyright owner and 
user, or whose functional claims are counted as nought.  Alternatively, one might seek to put 
the Ringmaster in the spotlight as a subject in its own right by demanding a new balance. 
This, I argue, is the surprising outcome of the decision of Gordon J in Telstra Corporation v  
Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd6 following the High Court’s decision in IceTV.7  In these 
cases the judiciary introduced three new-old subjects. The first was the ‘artist’, who displaced 
the merely functional claims of the copyright owner and user; the second was the ‘maker’ 
whose claims based on functionality were discounted – that is, excluded from the balance of 
private copyright interests. The third was the legislature itself who became a subject in its 
own right. By demanding that a different balance to be struck the judiciary effectively turned 
the spotlight back on the Ringmaster. 
Through  this  strategy  of  subjectivisation  the  judiciary  has  accomplished  what  political 
consultation and negotiation, as well as much academic writing, has so far failed to do.  It has 
put the question of the proper scope of copyright law, as well as the proper balance of public 
interests, back onto the legislative agenda. Whether this is enough to upset the police logic of 
balancing the interests in copyright law has yet to be seen. 
4 J Rancière,  Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy (Julie Rose trans, 1999).
5 Ibid 11.
6 Telstra Corporation v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44.
7 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14; (2009) 254 ALR 386. 
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From compromise to balance 
The use of the phrase 'balancing the interests' in relation to copyright law is relatively recent  
and it is notable that it was not used at all in debates on the Copyright Bill 1968.8  Prior to the 
1990s, the quintessential  political  term, 'compromise'  was used instead in relation to both 
copyright and patent law reform. In the Second Reading Speech for the Copyright Bill 1968 
the Attorney-General Mr Bowen, for example, expressed the hope that the Government had 
achieved  ‘a  reasonably  satisfactory  compromise  in  areas  where  there  are  conflicting 
interests’.9 
Compromise  is  not  balance.  What  is  important  about  compromise  is  that  it  involves  a 
sacrifice – at least one person has given something up – and this sacrifice is directed towards 
some end.   In  many  cases  this  may  involve  the  sacrifice  of  private,  economic  interests. 
Attorney-General Bowen again in relation to the same bill: 
Honourable members will therefore appreciate that any alteration in the 
existing  copyright  law will  affect  substantial  economic  interests  which 
have been built on the basis of that law. The interests affected will be the 
interests of both producers and users of materials protected by copyright.10
Traditionally in relation to intellectual property, economic freedom over works is sacrificed 
to the greater interests of the community. However, even the economic interests of the people 
may be sacrificed when the interests of the state are at stake. This is what happened in the 
case of the Patents Bill 1989 (which was meant to simplify the  Patents Act 1952 without 
substantially altering its effect) where the economic interests of the people were sacrificed to 
the emergence of the state on the world stage.  In a statement which one cannot imagine an 
Australian  Minister  uttering  today  Barry  Jones,  then  the  Minister  for  Science, 
Communications and Small  Business, began his second reading speech by acknowledging 
that  ‘the economic  costs  of  the patent  system probably exceeded its  benefits’.    Yet,  he 
continued, despite this Australia would maintain a patent system so that Australia could be 
part of the international system: 
Some view the  (patent)  system as  some  kind of  mysterious  sacrament 
which has to be observed if we are to proceed along the path to economic 
heaven. The (Intellectual  Property Advisory)  Committee (IPAC) took a 
more  pragmatic  view.  Faced  with  conflicting  opinions  on  economic 
8 In relation to political debates on patent law the only reference to balance I could find was by the Minister for  
Science, Communications and Small Business who referred to the need for inventors to balance the desire to 
exploit a new invention against the costs of retooling the factory shop. This is quite a different usage to the one 
under consideration here. Commonwealth,   Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,    1 June 1989, 
3479  (Barry Jones Minister for Science, Communications and Small Business).
9  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 May 1968, 1536 ( Lionel Bowen, 
Attorney-General).
10  Ibid. 
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questions, IPAC recognised that it is imperative that Australia continue to 
operate  a  patent  system  and  to  participate  in  the  international  patent 
system.11
The Minister may have called this a 'pragmatic' decision but this does not hide the fact that 
what  he was demanding was the sacrifice  of  Australia's  economic  interest  in  the greater 
interest of the emergence of the state on the world stage. What the Minister was describing 
was a  particularly historical,  that  is  to say Hegelian,  dialectic  in which the realisation  of 
political freedom is achieved through the sacrifice of other modes of being … including  the 
'economic heaven' of control over things.12
  
The sacrifice of history does not mean the destruction of the previous mode of being but 
rather the sublation of that mode which is taken up in the realisation of the self.  In other 
words, for the greater part of the twentieth century, under the rhetoric of compromise and 
sacrifice, intellectual property played a specifically historical role in which it was a means to 
an end rather than an end in itself. 
But suddenly, in 1990 everything changed.  Instead of demanding compromise and sacrifice 
the legislature was promising a 'balance of interests'.  Instead of working towards the ends of 
history and the achievement of social and public interests, the legislature was promising a 
'workable’ balance of competing interests.  And these interests were very narrow – they were 
the interests of the copyright owner and copyright user – public and social interests were 
rendered irrelevant.  If the ‘public interest’ were mentioned at all it was as a description of 
this balance. 
Since 1990 the refrain of balancing the interests in relation to copyright law reform has been 
constant  and  used  by  all  parties.   Consider   Labor  Senator  Bolkus  on  the  Copyright  
Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill (1999):
Copyright  law  requires  a  delicate  balance  to  be  struck  between  the 
interests of those people who create material for use by others and those 
people who use the material. Provision must also be made for the interests 
of copyright communicators.13
11 Commonwealth,  Parliamentary  Debates,  House  of  Representatives,    1  June  1989,  3479 (Barry  Jones 
Minister for Science, Communications and Small Business). This was the sacrifice demanded by TRIPS avant 
la letter… and one which many non-western countries have made post TRIPS.
12 Hegel's personality theory of property, including intellectual property, is found in G Hegel,   Philosophy of  
Right, (TM Know trans, first published 1821, 1967ed).   Perhaps the most influential work on contemporary 
writing on the end of  history is  Alexandre  Kojéve,  Introduction to the Reading of  Hegel.  Lectures  on the  
Phenomenology of Spirit, (assembled by Raymond Queneau, ed Allan Bloom, trans James H Nichols Jr, first  
published 1947, 1969 ed) [trans of: Introduction á la Lecture de Hegel] see especially fn 14 pp 208-209.  This 
position was popularised by Francis Fukuyama,  The end of history and the last man  (1992). 
13 Commonwealth,  Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 17 August 2000, 16579, (Nick Bolkus).
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Or compare Labor Senator Stephens on the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Bill 
2004: 
Another thing that Labor considers very important and one that we have 
heard a lot about is the issue of maintaining the fine balance between users 
and owners of copyright. Any alteration in our copyright legislation could 
result in significant costs, especially for educational institutions.14
Even those opposed to the amendment in question rely on the idea of balance.  For example, 
Greens Senator Kerry Nettle (7 December 2004) on the Copyright Legislation Amendment 
Bill 2004 regarding the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement criticised it on the basis that it 
was 'unbalanced': 
Thanks  to  the  Howard  government  we  now  have  some  of  the  most 
unbalanced and restrictive  intellectual  property laws in the world,  with 
holders or owners of copyright—that is, primarily big business—holding 
all of the cards at the expense of users and consumers such as libraries, 
universities, Australian industry and ordinary consumers.15 
There are certain common themes of this rhetoric of balance.  First, the balance is always said 
to be based on evidence provided by extensive consultation with stakeholders.   In the Second 
Reading  debate  on  the  Copyright   Amendment  Bill  2006,  for  example,  the  (Liberal) 
Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock stated that  the bill ‘is a result of extensive consultation 
and ...  delivers  on  a  number  of  copyright  reviews  undertaken  in  the  past  few years'.  In 
particular, he noted that the Bill includes the Federal Government's responses to:
... the fair use and other exceptions review, the review of the Digital Agenda 
Act  amendments,  the  review of  protection  of  subscription  broadcasts,  the 
Intellectual  Property  and  Competition  Review  Committee's  review  of 
copyright  under  the  competition  principles,  the  Copyright  Review 
Committee's review of jurisdictional procedures of the Copyright Tribunal, 
the report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional  Affairs  on  technological  protection  measures,  and  the 
technical review of all Australian legislation to ensure consistency with the 
Australian Criminal Code.16 
Second, the object of such consultation and legislative reform is always narrow, even modest 
– it is to provide a 'workable' balance. Labor MP Duncan on the Copyright Amendment Bill 
1992 regarding parallel importation of sound recordings: 
14 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 4 August 2004, 25694, (Ursula Stephens).
15 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 December 2004,  106 (Kerry Nettle).
16 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,   1 November 2006, 31, (Philip Ruddock, 
Attorney-General).
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The Government believes that the changes… provide a sensible, fair and 
workable balance of competing interests.17
  
Or Liberal Senator Kay Paterson on the Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Bill 1999: 
The bill, with the changes that are being moved, forms a balanced package 
of rights… It is a workable scheme.18 
Third,  the  rhetoric  of  balance  does  not  suggest  that  everyone  is  happy with the  result  - 
agreeing to disagree is one of the characteristics of this mode of political reasoning.  Consider 
(Liberal) Senator Kate Ellison on the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006:
Clearly,  not all amendments will be well received by copyright owners, 
and  not  all  amendments  will  be  well  received  by  copyright  users. 
Copyright  law  is  an  exercise  in  the  balancing  of  rights  in  the  public 
interests.  The government  believes  that  the  final  bill,  together  with  its 
amendments, which are the result of significant consultation and scrutiny 
by parliamentary committee, has got the balance right.19
These  comments  almost  mirror  those  of  (Labor)  MP  Daryl  Melham  in  relation  to  the 
Copyright Amendment Bill (No 2) 1997  regarding the parallel import of CDs: 
Inevitably, the establishment of any copyright law or intellectual property 
regime involves  the balancing of rights,  and it  is  perhaps inevitable  in 
these  circumstances  that  some  people  will  complain  about  the  balance 
struck by the government of the day.  However, the parliament can and 
does have a responsibility to review that balance and to satisfy itself that 
the government has got the balance right.20
Balancing the interests, unlike compromise, does not promise a common historical end or 
even a substantive solution but rather the finding of a 'workable' balance which is an end in 
itself.  But this begs the question of who or what counts in this balance. 
A picture of balance 
17 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,   16 December 1992, 3894 ( Peter 
Duncan).
18 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 December 2000, 21067 (Kay Paterson).
19  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 November 2006,  114 (Kate Ellison). 
20  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,   25 June 1997, 6311 (Daryl Melham). 
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For lawyers, the most familiar representation of balance is the scales 
of  justice  carried  by  a  blindfolded  Justicia  armed  with  a  sword.21 
Many  commentators  have  discussed  the  paradox  of  Justicia's 
blindness  –  how does  she  read  the  scales,  should  a  blind  woman 
brandish a sword?22  Others have reflected on the double play of the 
sword which represents both the power of the state and the pain of 
judgement.23 The scales carried by Justicia are less often discussed. 
This is perhaps because, as William Ian Miller has suggested, their 
meaning appears  obvious to those of us imbued with the values of 
law  schools  and  evidence.24  Weighing  the  evidence  is  the  very 
process of justice, and until that has been done, judgement is left in 
the balance.  Judgement is made when the scales are tilted by a preponderance of evidence 
and, for we lawyers, the greater the imbalance, the more sure the justice.  Strange then, from 
a  lawyer's  point  of  view,  that  the  legislature  might  seek  to  legitimate  their  reforms  by 
reference to 'balance', unless they too are claiming that their decision flows from the evidence 
- thereby imbuing their political decision with the legitimacy of legal judgement.25       
However,  politicians  do not  stake the legitimacy of  their  decisions  on the  weight  of  the 
evidence but on the will of the people – and the people do not agree.  This inability to agree is 
the  challenge  of  all  political  organisation  and  one  which,  we  are  told  from  Plato  on, 
democracy is particularly unsuited to meet.  It is not simply that the tyranny of the majority 
overrules the interests of the minority but rather that in a democracy everyone is said to have 
a voice which demands that their infinitely different interests be met.  It is not Lady Justicia  
whom politicians call on to strike a balance between these competing demands but rather the 
wisdom of Solomon. 
In the book of Kings, God appeared to King Solomon in a dream and promised anything he 
asked for.  Instead  of  asking  for  a  long  life,  private  wealth  or  the  death  of  his  enemies 
Solomon asks for ‘discernment in administering justice’ (in the New International Version) or 
‘understanding to discern judgement’ (King James version).26  I your servant, Solomon says, 
am ‘here  among  the  people  you  have  chosen,  a  great  people,  too  numerous  to  count  or 
21 For a discussion of the Wisdom of Solomon in relation to legal ethics see Joseph Allegretti, 'Rights, Roles, 
relationships: The Wisdom of Solomon and the Ethics of Lawyers' (1992) 25 Creighton Law Review 1119 also 
Robert Cover, ‘Violence and the Word' (1986) 95  Yale Law Journal 1601. 
22 William Ian Miller, Eye for an Eye (2006) 1. 
23 As Robert Cover reminds us, law is played out on the field of pain and death - '(a)s a result of the judge 
speaking someone loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.'  Robert Cover n 20, 1601. 
24 William Ian Miller, Eye for an Eye  (2006), 4. 
25 Scales offer up the promise of accuracy and rationality but also of trickery and error (which only blindness  
might  overcome).  ‘The  scales  are  the  signature  emblem of  the  trader,  those  people  who  are  taken  as  the 
torchbearers for a particular view of rationality as economic rationality… It is standard archaeological deduction 
that when scales are found among the grave goods, the skeleton they accompany was involved in trade… Lady  
Justice borrows her defining instrument from the defining instrument of precisely those people mistrusted from 
time immemorial as sharp practicers.’ Ibid 5.
26 1 Kings 3: 11 (New International Version).
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number. So give your servant a discerning heart to govern your people and to distinguish 
between right and wrong.’27 
The writer of Kings then retells the well known tale of the ‘wise ruling’ by King Solomon. 
Two prostitutes who live alone in a house appear before the King.  The first woman tells 
Solomon that she had a baby and that three days later the second woman also had a baby.  
During the night the second woman’s baby died ‘because she lay on him’.  The first woman 
tells the King that the second woman then swapped the babies – putting the dead baby beside 
the first woman and the living baby on her own breast. In the morning the first woman awoke 
and saw that the dead baby by her side was not hers. The second woman denies this and a 
dispute arises, and continues without agreement. 
The King sums up the dispute: ‘This one says “my son is alive and your son is dead” while 
the other says, “No your son is dead and mine is alive.”’ There is no possibility of agreement 
so the King then says, ‘Bring me my sword’. He gave the order that the living baby be cut in 
two and that half should be given to the first woman and half to the other.
http://www.dkimages.com/discover/previews/760/339339.JPG
The first woman is filled with compassion for her son and begs the King to give the second 
woman the living baby rather than let  him die.  The second woman on the contrary says 
‘Neither I nor you shall have him. Cut him in two.’  Then, we are told, the King gave his 
ruling; ‘Give the living baby to the first woman. Do not kill him; she is his mother’. 
It might be thought today that the wisdom of Solomon is to have devised a particularly nasty 
trick to discern the most ‘fit parent’ regardless of who might be the biological mother but this 
ignores the fact that the writer of Kings refers to the baby as the first woman’s son and that 
Solomon himself does not equivocate in his decision – ‘she is his mother’.   I would suggest 
another reading in which the wisdom of Solomon is to have determined the truth of what is 
directly rather than by resort to the usual legal procedures of witnesses, sacred lots, purgation 
27 1 Kings 3: 8-9 (New International Version). 
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or ordeals. This, argues Nelson, is the theological truth of the story – that the wisdom of god 
is literally inside Solomon. 28  
Rather  than  being  a  trick,  Solomon’s  resort  to  (and  then  abandonment)  of  the  sword 
demonstrates  the  limits,  and  even  absurdities,  of  mere  legal  thinking,  as  opposed  to  the 
wisdom of judgement.29  In the story of Solomon, the truth of what is  is at the same time the 
answer to what  should  be. For Solomom, the question of what should be disappears in the 
question of what is – ‘she is his mother’.  There is a difference between the judgement of 
Solomon and the work of political judgement, however, which this story glosses over.  In the 
story of Solomon the parties to the dispute are already determined – they are the two women 
who come before Solomon and ask for his judgement.   In the case of political decisions,  
however, the question of who is a party to a dispute, of who counts,  is itself a political 
decision which cannot/should not  be ignored.30 
When politicians speak of balancing the interests in intellectual property law today they do 
not mean that they have enforced a (political) compromise nor that they have weighed the 
(legal) evidence. Instead, what they have done is bring to light the balance of interests which 
already exists.  In focusing on the  is, the question of what  should be is held in abeyance. 
Furthermore, in making this decision they gloss over the fact that in coming to the decision 
the  question  of  who  counts  has  already  been  determined.  In  the  balance  of  interests  in 
copyright law it is the interests of copyright owners and users which are taken into account – 
the  interests  of  society,  or  the  public  count  for  nothing.   We might  say that,  today,  the 
wisdom of Solomon amounts  to nothing more than the wisdom of surveys  and statistics, 
consultations and transparency– each of these things makes more clear what is, each avoids 
the question of who counts and what should be. 
This is delightfully, if absurdly illustrated by the Federal government's recent decision not to 
lift the existing partial ban on the parallel importation of books despite the recommendations 
of the Productivity Commission and support of the  Competition Minister Craig Emerson 
who had proposed a 'compromise position'.31  This was an issue with potentially profound 
effects on fundamental aspects of Australian culture  and, in recognition of this,  interested 
parties ran sophisticated campaigns regarding the public and social benefits of protecting the 
Australian  publishing  industry  (on  the  one  side)  or  making  books  cheaper  and  more 
28 R  Nelson, Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching.  First and Second Kings (1987), 
38-39 referring to 1 Kings 3: 28 (King James Version).
29 Joseph Allegretti, 'Rights, Roles, relationships: The Wisdom of Solomon and the Ethics of Lawyers' (1992) 25 
Creighton Law Review 1119, 1128. As Allegretti has noted, Solomon’s resort to the sword might be seen as a 
‘gross caricature’ of the violence inherent in all legal judgement but this ignores the theological objectives of the 
tale at 1128. Allegretti himself argues that the tale exemplifies the superiority of an ethics of care over ‘rights-
oriented thinking’ at 1130.
30 In this sense, the judgement of Solomon is more closely aligned to a legal judgement than to a political 
judgement … a sorry state when the value of the law has already been dismissed.
31 The existing parallel importation ban gave Australian publishers 30 days in which to publish an overseas book 
and another 90 days to supply it.   Copyright Act 1968 ss 44A and 112A. The 'compromise position' would have 
reduced the 30 days to seven days. 
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accessible to the Australian reading public (on the other).   Commentators sought to weigh 
the social value of reading against the need to have a distinctively Australian cultural voice. 
Australian publishers argued that the existing balance was  'just right'.32 Booksellers, on the 
other  hand,  argued  that  the  existing  balance  needed  to  be  changed  so  that  they  could 
effectively compete against online booksellers.  
This  broadly  based discussion  of  what  should  be continued  even after  the  government’s 
decision was made, when the decision was widely condemned on the basis of competition 
policy, history and social values. Michael Sutchbury of The Australian, for example, wrote: 
(The decision)  signals  that  the Rudd government  is  no Hawke-Keating 
government and that it is now open season for rent-seekers to plunder the 
general interest.33 
Ex liberal staffer Christian Kerr of The Australian, on the other hand, criticised the decision 
on  the  basis  that  it  betrayed  the  working  class,  rather  than  that  it  betrayed  competition 
principles: 
by maintaining the privileged position of publishing yesterday, the Rudd government 
has betrayed the party’s articles of faith.
The Labor Party is more a product of Methodism than Marx. 
Kerr  conjured  John  Stuart  Mill  to  promote  the  values  of  working  class  self  help,  self 
improvement, and the value of books: 
(The early labour movement) knew about the greater worth of self improvement – and 
the greater worth of books.
The Kevin Rudd Labor Party knows the worth of luvvies.34
In the end all these arguments counted for nothing. Although the government agreed that 
competition was a good thing, and that the existing partial ban put Australian booksellers at a 
competitive disadvantage, they rejected the call to lift the ban on the basis that the booksellers 
32 As Tom Dusevic put it in The Australian 'One of the arguments used by the publishers was part cheek, part 
misty-eyed Labor nostalgia.' He quotes Jose Borghino, the in-house advocate of the Publisher's Association: 'We 
said the 1991 reforms,  introducing the 30 day and 90 day rules  on availability,  had transformed the local  
publishing industry… And it was bloody good.'  Of course, Dusevic, points out, Borghino neglects to say that 
publishers and authors had tried to stop those reforms at the time. Tom Dusevic, ‘Publishers win the day in a  
thriller’,  The Australian, November 12, 2009, p 4.
33 Michael Sutchbury, 'Decision betrays lack of spine',  The Australian, November 12, 2009 p 1. 
34 Christain Kerr, ‘Labor panders to luvvies',  The Australian 12 November 2009, p4.
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were already so disadvantaged that nothing could save them from the competitive ravages of 
online book selling. Dr Emerson himself had to proclaim the government’s position:
Competition from internet and online booksellers will apply competitive 
pressure on both price and availability, so we decided it wasn’t warranted 
to change the regulations.'35
In other words, in the balancing of the interests in the debate on the parallel importation of 
books the government reflected the balance of what is rather than what should be. Not only 
were broader matters of social meaning excluded from the final decision but the dying body 
of the booksellers weighed next to nothing in this balance. 
This was not a one off event but rather the repetition of a form of political reasoning which, 
as  we  have  seen,  has  been  familiar  since  1990.  It  has  been  used  to  justify  changes  to 
legislation as well as decisions not to change legislation. It is used even where the issues of 
substance,  social  meaning  and  principle  appear  obvious.  Consider  the  2006  debate  on 
whether a new defence of fair dealing for the purposes of parody or satire should be included 
in the Copyright Act (Cth) 1968.  Since the time of the Greeks, democracy and parody have 
developed hand in hand, and the skills of satirists and parodists have traditionally been called 
upon to engage the people in the democratic process.  Furthermore, a love of parody and a 
facility in its use are thought to be part of the great Australian character – represented by the 
larrikin who doesn't take anything too seriously.  The question of whether there should be a 
fair dealing defence for parody or satire would therefore seem to beg for a principled decision 
of what should be based on the central role of parody and satire in a democracy, its role as a 
vehicle for free speech,  and its ability to express the Australian character.  However, this did 
not happen.  Despite the fact that stakeholders and commentators did raise these issues the 
government introduced the defence not on the basis of any principle but on the basis that the 
defence already existed.  
In coming to this decision the government simply reflected the decision in  TCN Channel  
Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd36  where the criticism and review defence under the 
Copyright Act  (Cth) 1968 was interpreted widely enough to encompass parodic use, whilst 
satiric use was said to be unlikely to amount to a copyright infringement at all.  This was  
because, as the judge explained, satire usually does not contain any reproduction of copyright 
material.  The new statutory defence did not interfere with the copyright owner’s interests 
because  these  interests  had  already  been  interfered  with.  The  new  legislative  balance 
reflected  a  balance  of  interests  which  already  existed.  As  the  Australian  Subscription 
Television and Radio Association in its submission to the Standing Committee on Legal and 
35 Quoted  by Lenore Taylor, 'Rudd dodges reform of publishing industry' The Australian, November 12, 2009 p 
4.
36 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd (2001) 184 ALR 1. 
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Constitutional Affairs, the Bill created ‘certainty for copyright users while not diminishing 
the rights of copyright owners’.37  
Now, it could be suggested that there is nothing surprising in saying that law will mirror the 
balance of interests as they already exist in the world.  This was certainly the position taken 
by Roscoe Pound in his classic works on the nature of interests. Pound classified interests as 
'individual',  'social'  or  'public'  interests  where  individual  interests  encompass  individual 
physical  and spiritual  existence,  domestic  interests  and individual  economic  life.38 Social 
interests are the interests of the community at large (general security, the security of political 
and social  institutions, general morals, social resources and general progress)39 and public 
interests are the interests of the state as a juristic person.40   For Pound, interests are real and 
primary to law, which simply reflects what already exist: 
(The law) does not create these interests… they arise, apart from the law, 
through the competition of individuals with each other, the competition of 
groups or societies  with each other,  and the competition of individuals 
with  such groups  or  societies.   The  law does  not  create  them,  it  only 
recognises them.41 
Pound argues that the law has a specific role to play in relation to these competing interests:
The  legal  system  attains  its  end  by  recognising  certain  interests  – 
individual, public, and social, - by defining the limits within which these 
interests shall be recognised legally and given effect through the force of 
the state, and by endeavouring to secure the interest so recognised within 
the defined limits.42  
For Pound, it almost goes without saying that the strict concern of the law is not individual or 
even public interests but rather social interests, 'since it is the social interest in securing the 
individual  interest  that  must  determine  the  law  to  secure  it.'43  Pound,  as  an  American 
jurisprude, characterises copyright as a law relating to a social interest in cultural progress44 
and patent law as a social interest in the encouragement of invention.45 In other words, Pound 
37  Submission 28, p 3 as cited in Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Senate,  Copyright  
Amendment Bill 2006 [Provisions] (2006) 26 .
38 Roscoe Pound, 'Interests of Personality' (1915) Vol XXVIII no 4 Harvard Law Review 343, 349.
39 Roscoe Pound, 'A Survey of Social Interests' (1943) Vol LVII No 1 Harvard Law Review 1.
40 Pound, n 37, 344.  In  Pound n 28, 1, 1 fn 2 Pound acknowledges that he has used the classification suggested 
by RV JIhering,  Der Zwerk im Recht  (1877) 467-483.  
41 Pound n 37, 343-344.
42 Ibid 343. 
43 Ibid 344.
44 Pound n 38, 32.
45Ibid  31. 
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treats the law as an exercise in sovereignty – directed to the ends of sovereignty and the state  
rather than as a technique to secure the ends of the thing to be regulated. 
What  distinguishes  the  balance  of  interests  in  copyright  law today from Roscoe Pound's 
balance of interests is not the fact that law reflects the balance of interests which already 
exists (Pound knew this) but that questions of social and public meaning are excluded from 
the count. The interests which count are the interests of copyright owners and copyright users 
and the success of the copyright system has become an end in itself –a ‘workable balance’, as 
they say.  No wonder, as Peter Drahos has commented, that intellectual property law reform 
has been reduced to a 'game of inches', concerning for example, 'the right level at which to set 
the standard of (patent)  inventiveness'46 or just how many weeks an Australian  publisher 
might have to publish a book before parallel importation restrictions are lifted.47 No wonder 
no-one is completely happy with the result. 
Instead of Lady Justicia armed with a sword, or King Solomon in the act of judgement, we 
need another picture of balance where only certain interests  and parties  count.  I would like 
to put before you the picture of an acrobatic troupe poised on a bike. 
Within traditional circus lore the acrobat represents mastery over one’s own body rather than 
mastery over the external  world and in this  sense the acrobat  is a particularly ahistorical 
figure.48  The beaming smiles and glowing eyes of the acrobats as they look straight ahead 
may suggest that they are riding into a glorious future but this is simply a performance – the 
circus ring is round and they are going nowhere.
46Peter  Drahos,  'Submission  to  Senate  Community Affairs  Committee  Inquiry  into  Gene  Patents'  which  is  
Chapter  11 of  his  then forthcoming book  The Global Governance  of  Knowledge:  Patent  Offices  and their  
Clients  (2010). 
47 The game continues - booksellers are now demanding that  in order to change the balance,  Amazon.com 
should be required to pay GST on books. 
48 Tim  Boucher,  'The  Acrobat',  Circus  Characters,  History,  Archetypes  and  Symbolism 
http://circuscharacters.org/.
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Chinese Golden Dragon Acrobats.
http://frank.mtsu.edu/~proffice/Reco rd/Rec_v12/rec1215/acrobats.jpg
Further,  the  acrobatic  performance  represents  a  working  balance  achieved  from  the 
organisation and harmonisation of bodies and things which already exists. To achieve this 
balance  the  acrobats  may  have  flexed  their  muscles,  put  on  a  face  and almost  certainly 
quarrelled. Perhaps not one of them is perfectly happy with the result - one may have wanted 
something more ambitious, another thinks they have taken too great a risk, another may have 
preferred to be on the top rather than bearing the weight of others. But overall it is a workable 
balance which reflects the skills and abilities of those performers who count. 
There is little point in complaining that only the acrobatic and fit are included in the balance. 
In achieving its working balance only the acrobatic and fit are fit to be counted. In exactly the 
same way, it is pointless to object that the acrobatic act is without meaning or purpose – the 
working balance of the acrobats is an end in itself. The logic of the acrobatic act legitimates 
its own form even whilst excluding all those non acrobatic others. 
And where is the state in all of this?  The state is not the acrobat nor even the acrobats’ trainer 
but  rather  the  Ringmaster  who,  according  to  Tim  Boucher,  directs  attention  to  the 
performance and so 'acts as interpreter of events on behalf of the audience'.49 The ringmaster 
may, as  Boucher reminds us, step in when an act is not ready – a form of market failure 
within the context of the circus – but the state is not a steerer, let alone a rower, within the 
context of the show.  Despite the fact that the skills of the ringmaster are not the object of the 
49 Ibid 'The Ringmaster'. 
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show, when the ringmaster shouts 'Da dah' s/he basks in the reflected glory of the performers' 
achievements.
However, there is something amiss when political decision making can be reduced to a circus 
act - within a democracy the question of who counts and what ‘should be’ are still important. 
We therefore need to consider what needs to be done to upset this balance and reintroduce 
matters of principle into the copyright law reform agenda.  
Upsetting the balance 
In the rhetoric of balancing the interests we are all copyright owners and users now and every 
attempt  to  (re)introduce  matters  of  principle  through  fairer  procedures,  community 
consultation and the collection of evidence is doomed for failure. Community consultation 
and the gathering of evidence becomes just another technique to more finely calibrate the 
interests  of copyright  owners and users so that  the legislation  will  reflect  a more  perfect 
balance.  Social and public interests are excluded at the expense of a workable balance and 
this  balance  becomes  an end in  itself.  The political  rhetoric  of balancing the interests  in 
copyright law amounts to nothing less than the death of principle in political debate. 
Political theorists have many names for this form of political reasoning.  Jacques Rancière for 
example calls it a form of ‘police logic’.50  Michel Foucault, invoking La Perrière, calls it 
'governmentality' - 'the right disposition of things  arranged so as to lead to a convenient end'.
51  The end of police logic or governmentality is not submission to the law and the sovereign 
(or what Pound has called social or public interest), but rather the ends of things themselves:  
 
Government is defined as a right manner of disposing of things so as to 
lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurist's texts would have 
said, but to an end that is 'convenient' for each of the things that are to be 
governed.52 
When Rancière  refers to  police  logic  he does  not  mean a repressive regime but  rather  a 
totalising order which uses techniques  – such as communication,  procedure,  consultation, 
medicine and even law itself - to aggregate, organise, distribute and then legitimate consent 
50 Rancière n 3.
51  M Foucault, 'Governmentality’, in Power. Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984 Vol 3  edited James D 
Faubion, translated Robert Hurley and others Penguin 2002, pp 201- 222, p 210.  Such theories have a familial  
resemblance  to an earlier  concern  with the end of ideology and the rise of technocratic.  For a  specifically 
Australian take on this issue see Robert Catley and Bruce J McFarlane, From Tweedledum to Tweedledee: the  
new Labor government in Australia, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1974.
52 Foucault Ibid  201, 211. Foucault explains the problem of the common good as a problem of circularity: 'the  
common good' refers to a state of affairs where all the subjects without exception obey the laws, accomplish the 
tasks assigned to them, practice the trade to which they are assigned, and respect the established order conforms 
to the laws imposed by God on nature and men…In every case, what characterises the end of sovereignty, this  
common and general good, is in sum nothing other than submission to sovereignty'  at 210.
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whilst simultaneously excluding from the count all that is un(ac)countable or without value 
according to the ends of the things governed. It is that order which determines what is seen 
and heard and what becomes merely blur or noise.  Policing does not discipline bodies so 
much as provide a ground for their appearance – it ‘distributes the sensible’, to use Rancière's 
famous phrase.53 
From  a  political  point  of  view  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  upset  this  balance  of  interests. 
Balancing the private  interests  of  copyright  owners  and users  by reflecting  what  already 
exists excuses governments from the unpopular work of determining competing social values 
on matters of principle and ensures that no sacrifice is demanded in the name of a higher 
good.  Further, the balance becomes self perpetuating. Every time a balance of interests is 
translated  into  legal  form (at  either  an  international  or  domestic  level)  it  reinforces  and 
sustains that balance.  Law transforms a (possibly fleeting) existing balance of interests into 
an ongoing  system of rights and duties – or in this case, exclusive rights and defences – 
which sustains that balance through time and space. 
In contradiction to those political theorists caught in its thrall, Rancière dismisses community 
consultation  and  evidence  gathering  as  political  strategies  to  upset  police  logic.54 Such 
consultation is not politics itself,  Rancière argues, rather  politics is that which disrupts the 
harmony of police logic. For Rancière politics is intermittent and sometimes scandalous and 
it  arrives  in  sporadic  acts  of what  he calls  ‘subjectivisation’.  Subjectivisation,  he argues, 
challenges  the existing distribution of social  bodies by making new subjects appear.55  It 
upsets the balance and is the equivalent of bringing on the clowns in the circus performance. 
When  Peter  Drahos56 on  global  intellectual  property,  Richard  Hindmarsh  on  genetically 
modified  crops,57  Graham  Dutfield  on  intellectual  property  and  the  life  sciences  or 
indigenous people,58 Siva Vaidhyanathan59 on copywrongs, or  Carlos Correa60 and Susan Sell 
on intellectual  property and developing nations for example,  plot the strategies  by which 
53  J Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: the distribution of the sensible (Gabriel Rockhill trans) 2006. 
54 Rancière argues that the reliance on consultation is based on a fundamental misapprehension– that is, that the 
sharing a universal language supposes a universal world, the assumption that because communication relies on 
understanding it has mutual understanding as its end, n 3 Chapter 3, ‘The rationality of disagreement’  43.
55 Rancière identifies the birth of democracy itself as an example of such a political act of subjectivisation.  
Democracy,  he  argues,  is  that  which  disrupts  the  order  of  privilege  or  nature  based  on  wealth,  virtue  or 
privilege. Democracy is a scandal precisely because it cannot be legitimated by reference to any privilege or 
principle of community  but rather exists as a demand to count those who have no right to be counted – the free. 
It is not that democracy or politics came to provide a solution to the problems of class struggle but rather, that  
politics and democracy constituted the ‘people’ as a people who are taken into account: ‘The struggle between 
rich and poor is not social reality, which politics then has to deal with. It is the actual institution of politics itself.  
… Politics does not happen just because the poor oppose the rich. It is the other way around: politics (that is, the  
interruption of the simple effects of domination by the rich) causes the poor to exist as an entity’, n 3, 11. 
56 P  Drahos,  A Philosophy of  Intellectual  Property   (1996);  P Drahos  and  J  Braithwaite,  Global  Business  
Regulation  (2000);  Peter  Drahos  with  J  Braithwaite,  Information  Feudalism.   Who  owns  the  knowledge  
economy? (2002); P Drahos,  The Global Governance of Knowledge: patent offices and their client (2010). 
57 Richard Hindmarsh,  Edging Towards Bioutopia.  A New Politics of Reordering Life and the Democratic  
Challenge (2008).
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private interests shape intellectual property law we could simply dismiss their work as just 
another mirror of a balance of interests which already exists.  When writers such as these 
demand  a  'fairer  balance'  by  ensuring  community  representation  on  key  IP  committees, 
training for IP negotiators in international fora, financial assistance for developing countries 
to take cases before the WTO as well as 'counter networks of outsiders'61  we might think that 
they too are caught  in  the thrall  of community consultation  and evidence  gathering,  that 
nothing they can say will upset the police logic of copyright owners and users. 
However, I would like to suggest otherwise.  When writers such as these plot the strategies by 
which  private  interests  shape  intellectual  property  in  their  own  image  they  disrupt  the 
totalising, naturalising charm of the police order of balance and instead make manifest the 
way in which that order is created.62  But they also do more. By a process of subjectivisation 
they recast and open up other possible worlds in which the players are otherwise – no longer 
simply intellectual property owners and users but feudal lords and serfs;63 'new insiders for 
insider governance'64 (Drahos);   the North and the South ( Susan Sell);65 biopirates (RAFI) or 
Pharmas.   The process goes both ways of course - video and music pirates did not exist 
before we created them. 
Unfortunately, these strategies of subjectivisation have not been very successful in the case of 
copyright law and it is has  proved all too easy to dismiss any dissenting voice as the self 
interested  claim  of  a  copyright  owner  or  user.  Those  who attempt  to  upset  the  existing 
balance  by championing  free  speech or  open access;  those  who demand  a robust  public 
domain or a limit  to the extent of copyright  monopolies;  those who seek to stand on the 
shoulders of giants, are dismissed as free riders or thieves – that is, copyright users who do 
not want to pay. Conversely, those who seek to protect their communal cultural heritage from 
appropriation;  those  who  seek  to  protect  culture  from  the  processes  of  reification  and 
58 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Sciences: Past, Present and Future (2nd ed 2009); 
Darrell  A Posey and Graham Dutfield,  Beyond Intellectual Property; toward traditional resource rights for  
indigenous people and local communities (1996).
59 Siva Vaidhyanatham,  Copyrights and Copywrongs: the rise of  intellectual property and how it  threatens  
creativity (2003). 
60 Carlos Correa,  Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO & Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement &  
Policy Options (2000).
61 Peter  Drahos,  'Submission to Senate Community Affairs  Committee Inquiry into Gene Patents'  which is 
Chapter  11 of  his  then forthcoming book  The Global Governance  of  Knowledge:  Patent  Offices  and their  
Clients  (2010). 
62 Kathy Bowrey and Natalie Fowell in ‘Digging up fragments and building IP franchises’, (2009) Vol 1 No 2 
June Sydney Law Review 185, 192  question the usefulness of ‘denaturalising’ intellectual property so as to 
‘locate it in the domain of practical politics’: ‘Outside of a few elites who regularly fly business class to 
Geneva,’ they ask, ‘who needs to be convinced that these (global) bodies push particular agendas and laws that 
promote particular multinational interests?’ at 196.  Bowrey and Fowell would prefer a different focus – the 
problem with such an approach, they argue, is that it, ignores ‘more complex jurisprudential questions about the 
organisation of legal power’, ‘the role of law in supporting commodification’ and ‘the limits of positive law’ at 
185. 
63 Peter Drahos with J Braithwaite, Information Feudalism.  Who owns the knowledge economy? (2002). 
64 Drahos n 45. 
65 Susan K Sell, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (1998). 
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commodification;  those who champion a creative commons are characterised  as potential 
copyright owners.66 
The ease of this transformation bears witness to an important feature of the categories of 
copyright owners and users today. As a form of subjectivity they are ‘bare’- that is, almost  
devoid of meaning.  This is not a new insight. As early as 1936 Walter Benjamin pointed out 
that  in  the  age  of  mechanical  reproduction  the  relationship  between  the  author  and  the 
author’s public had become ‘merely functional’,67  that is, every member of the public was a 
potential author, and every author in turn was transformed into a consumer of the works of 
mass  (re)production.  What  was  prescient  in  1936 has  become  ‘viral’  in  the  twenty  first 
century where the functional relationship of the author and the author’s public goes by the 
name of copyright owner and user and the dizzying transformation from one to the other is 
endless.  From twitter to facebook, from gaming to data bases, from student to multinational 
corporation – we are all copyright owners and users now. 
If we are to successfully disrupt the police logic of balancing the interests in copyright law it 
is not enough to simply introduce more subjects with different functional relationships with 
works.  Instead, we need to disrupt the claims of functionality on which copyright owners and 
users base their claims and at the same time introduce new subjects whose prior claims are 
grounded in law and whose legal interests displace the merely functional claims of copyright 
owners and users. 
This  was  the  surprising  strategy  adopted  by  Gordon  J  in  Telstra  Corporation  v  Phone  
Directories Company Pty Ltd68 following the High Court’s decision in IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine  
Network Australia  Pty Ltd.69  In  these cases the judiciary not  only introduced a  new-old 
subject  who  displaced  the  merely  functional  claims  of  the  copyright  owner,  they  also 
introduced a new subject whose claims based on functionality were (dis)counted. The first 
was the ‘author’ who was the original bearer of meaning in the  Statute of Anne   1709; the 
second was the ‘maker’ of a literary work who is neither an author nor a copyright owner but 
66 There are many more examples.  Online music distributors, for example, made an attempt to appear as a 
radical alternative to traditional music producers but were quickly reduced to free riders and thieves (copyright  
users) or technical precursors who opened up the possibility of profitable online music distribution but who  
could  not  really  expect  to  benefit  from  it  themselves  (copyright  owners  and  competitors).  Open  source 
advocates  have  become  a  'business  model'  for  copyright  owners  rather  than  a  challenge  to  the  property 
foundations  of  copyright  law.  And those  who  challenge  the  idea  of  individual  creativity  are  dismissed  as  
‘consumer rights activists’ (as the Senate Committee Report on the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 put it): 
‘Generally speaking … groups representing copyright owners or rights holders tended to support parts of the 
Bill which strengthen copyright protection …Conversely, those advocating consumer rights and the importance 
of fostering creativity and innovation argued that  the Bill  is  weighted towards copyright  owners and rights  
holders  to  the  ultimate  detriment  of  individual  consumers  and  the  wider  community.’  Senate  Standing 
Committee  on  Legal  and  Constitutional  Affairs,  Provisions  of  the  Copyright  Amendment  Bill  2006,  
Commonwealth of Australia, 13 November 2006, p11.
67 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (first published 1936), in J 
Morra and M Smith,  Visual Culture: experiences in visual culture (2006) 114, 124. 
68 Telstra Corporation v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44.
69 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14; (2009) 254 ALR 386. 
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merely  the  person  who  facilitates  the  creation  of  an  electronic  database.   Although  the 
‘maker’ of a work is protected under European database legislation and is the owner of the 
copyright  in  films,  sound  recordings  and  broadcasts  in  Australia,  this  maker  has  not 
previously made an appearance in Australian law in relation to original works. 
In  Telstra  Corporation  Ltd  v  Phone  Directories  Company  Pty  Ltd  Gordon  J  held  that 
copyright did not subsist in a telephone directory because copyright law was concerned with 
protecting  the  interests  of  individual  authors rather  than  simply  those  who  received  the 
economic benefit of the work or those who were (functionally) responsible for bringing it into 
existence. In this case there was no ‘author’,  rather the electronic databases in question were 
made  by many  people  (often  not  identified),  using  automated  computer  software  whose 
architecture  controlled  the  appearance  and  form  of  the  entry,  together  with  rules  and 
procedures which were either programmed into the software or, on rare occasions, applied by 
individuals.   Telstra  itself  was  not  an  ‘author’  but  merely  the  functional  ‘maker’  of  the 
databases and this was insufficient to grant protection under Australian copyright law.  
In coming to this decision Gordon J relied on the reasoning of the High Court in IceTV Pty  
Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd70 in which the purpose of the  Copyright Act  was said 
to be to  reward authors by striking a balance between competing public interests – that is the 
public  interest  in  encouraging  the  production  of  works  and  the  public  interest  in  the 
maintenance of a robust public domain.   IceTV   involved the production of an electronic 
television guide by IceTV which was updated by referring to Weekly Schedules produced by 
Channel Nine. Channel Nine objected to the reproduction by IceTV of the time and title 
information from Nine’s Weekly Schedule in the IceGuide updates.  The High Court held 
that the part taken was not substantial when judged against the central concept or ‘theoretical  
underpinnings’.  In  the  words  of  French  CJ,  Crennan  and  Kieffel  JJ,   this  theoretical 
underpinning was to  ‘reward… authors of original literary works with commercial benefits 
having regard to the fact that literary works in turn benefit the reading public’ or, in the words 
of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in their co-majority decision,  the central concept of the 
Copyright Act is to  ‘balance the public interest in promoting the encouragement of "literary", 
"dramatic", "musical" and "artistic works" … by providing a just reward for the creator, with 
the  public  interest  in  maintaining  a  robust  public  domain  in  which  further  works  are 
produced’. 71 
In both Telstra and IceTV, the fact that Telstra and Channel nine employees and contractors 
had expended considerable labour on the production of the works, the fact that the works 
were  of  significant  commercial  value,  and  the  fact  that  this  labour  may  have  been 
‘misappropriated’ by or used by the defendants was immaterial to the balance demanded by 
70 At 386.
71 French CJ, Crennan and Kieffel JJ at [24]; Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [71]. 
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the Act. The private economic interests of Telstra and Channel Nine were of no account in 
the balance of public interests demanded by the Act.72  
Both  the  High  Court  and  the  Federal  Court  observed  that,  although  other  jurisdictions 
protected the private interests of ‘makers’ of databases, there was no analogous legislation in 
Australia.73 Gordon  J  explicitly  acknowledged  the  inability  of  the  court  to  change  this 
position and said that it was a matter for the Parliament which should be addressed ‘without  
delay’: 
It is not open to me to ignore the express words of the Copyright Act to expand 
protection consistent with that set out in the (European) Directive as summarised by 
the High Court. That is a matter for Parliament and, in my view, a matter which 
they should address without delay.74
The effect of this decision is twofold.  By disrupting the claims of functionality on which the 
makers of databases have until now relied, the courts have presented a new challenge which 
requires the legislature to address the proper extent of copyright law once again, as a matter 
of principle. In particular, the legislature is called upon to decide whether the Copyright Act  
can or should be used to encourage the production of works regardless of whether or not there 
is an author of that work.  But the decision of the court does another thing as well.  The courts 
have put the legislature itself back in the picture as a subject in its own right in the ongoing 
play of copyright law reform. 
The role which the legislature will play has yet to be seen. It may seek to reprise its role as  
the Ringmaster – simply drawing our attention to a new balance of interests in which the 
maker of a database plays no part.  It may take on the role of a legalistic King Solomon – 
seeking to divide copyright spoils amongst the maker and the artist, new-old claimants whose 
broader interests are lost in the legal form. At worst it may practice a type of legerdemain 
where the discounted interests of the maker are made to reappear at the expense of the ‘artist’  
who is transformed in a flash into a functional copyright owner.  However, whatever role the 
legislature seeks to take on it is already in the picture – it has become a subject in its own 
right.  Through  this  strategy  the  courts  have  accomplished  what  consultation,  academic 
discussion and debate have so far failed to do – it has put the question of the proper scope of 
copyright  law, as well  as the proper balance of public interests,  back onto the legislative 
72 There is some question as to whether the High Court’s comments on authors and authorship were obiter (an 
argument explicitly rejected by Gordon J in  Telstra) and the High Court’s reliance on legal authorities from the 
United States and Canada and on secondary academic sources may give cause for concern.  However, these are 
not my questions here. Rather, what is of interest is that, in coming to these decisions the judiciary disrupted the 
balance of interests of copyright owners and users not simply by reintroducing new subjects but by introducing 
new legal subjects whose own claims displaced the copyright owner from the balance.
73 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14; (2009) 254 ALR 386, Gummow, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ at [135]; Telstra Corporation v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44 at [30].
74 Telstra Corporation v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44 at [30].
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agenda. It has called into question the proper role of the legislature. Whether this is enough to 
upset the police logic of balancing the interests in copyright law has yet to be seen. 
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